Unpublished Works
About My Research
In my current philosophical research, I am most interested in examining our perspectival condition and bringing this condition’s insights to bear on discussions ongoing in contemporary philosophy, such as human identity, ontology, and the philosophy of religion. Though this is the focus of my research, I write on a variety of other issues in essays not meant for formal publication. This page includes those essays that I do not intend to publish formally, whether they be personal philosophy essays or seminar papers from my university study.
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Abstract:
This short seminar paper attempts to describe the current state of modern philosophy. In it, I argue that Foucault takes the Kantian notions of liberation and progress (which seem to kickstart the late modern or contemporary period of philosophy) and turns them on their head. Kant had hoped that in liberating our reason, we would progress to Truth. Foucault brings this experiment crashing down - following Kant’s line of thinking all the way through - by arguing that no more can we hope for progress. Only liberation remains. -
Abstract:
This paper describes both the Humean and Kantian account of aesthetics. I argue that while there are some similarities between these accounts, the Kantian notion of aesthetical phenomenon necessarily expands on the empirical Humean account by highlighting aesthetics’ ability to reveal transcendence. -
Abstract:
One of the significant contemporary bioethical debates centers around the right to die, which is the ability of a patient to elect to have their life ended with the assistance of a medical provider. There are three primary procedures that stem from the right to die, and they are the removal of life-sustaining treatment, physician-assisted suicide, and voluntary active euthanasia. It is broadly accepted that the removal of life-sustaining treatment is morally permissible, yet, the other two are hotly contested. In this paper, I argue that voluntary active euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide are not morally permissible due to insufficient epistemological clarity. And by exploring this epistemological murkiness, I find another potential worry about these two procedures that is existential in nature. -
Abstract:
In this seminar paper, I explore the shape of the history of 20th-century analytic moral philosophy. During the course of this exploration, I give a summation of what I take to be analytic moral philosophy as it currently stands, the anti-realist threat looming over its situation, and a gesture to a constructivist solution as forwarded most relevantly by Christine Korsgaard.